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Abstract  
This thesis is an exploration of the nature and prevalence of sexual violence in large scale conflicts. 
It is written with a reflective standpoint as an innovative methodology, drawing on the work of 
Heather Smith, and the conversational nature present in the Feminist International Relations 
literature it draws on.  The theoretical framework used is a lens of dominant gender concepts, most 
notably hegemonic masculinity. It analyzes the militarized nature of popular masculinity, and in 
turn reflects on how these notions of masculinity are embedded within ideas of war and military. 
Then the thesis explores the concept of hegemonic masculinity and how it relates to the production 
of gender in society, and in turn how these models contribute to violence, war, and war rape. The 
overall findings of this thesis are that hegemonic masculinity contributes to an arrangement of 
society that allows for high levels of not only rape, but war itself. The evidence used to come to 
these conclusions also suggest that there is hope of ameliorating the problem of sexual violence in 


















I have always found rape to be a difficult concept to grasp. I believe that struggling to 
understand the existence of rape is common not only as an academic enterprise but also as a day-
to-day occurrence. As we go about living our daily lives, we are confused as to how it can be 
committed with the regularity that we hear about it. It is a horrible atrocity and yet it seems to 
continue indefinitely despite a greater push to punish those who commit rape. There are 
seemingly always new offenders and new victims. We try and address problems to do with the 
culture around rape, to change the narrative, and to ameliorate the problem, but it persists. Rape 
is a problem that is recognized not only in the domestic context but also in the international 
arena. 
I have chosen to focus my thesis on rape as it occurs in settings of war and armed 
conflict. Rape has seemingly always occurred during war. As I am completing my undergraduate 
studies, this is something I have come to understand as true -- as an uncontestable fact. In school 
I was taught that historically the idea that armies could, and did, rape the women of a defeated 
population was an accepted norm; that women were considered part of the victors’ prize. 
Moreover, a population under siege understood that their women were likely to be raped if they 
were to lose. Victims of rape are often left behind after a point of conflict, leaving further lasting 
damage on a population. Despite being somewhat aware of this problem, my education led me to 
a point where my understanding was rocked. The scale of sexual violence in war was beyond 
anything I had imagined. Atrocities of mass rape have been committed by soldiers and 
combatants in overwhelming numbers. I find it difficult even now to wrap my brain around the 
sheer enormity of the problem that I have delved into in this thesis. I do not doubt that most 
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people, while understanding the large numbers cited herein, can never truly grasp the vastness of 
the experiences of the victims. The way I look at rape not only has been changed by the very 
process of studying it, but also has been a product of who I am and how I learn. 
I write this thesis as a reflective piece because I cannot separate myself from my research. 
Although I spend time examining historical examples, and attempting to explain some of this 
behaviour with theoretical frameworks of masculinity, I weigh these against my own perspective 
because this line of inquiry has called into question my own understanding of what it means to 
me to be a man. I draw inspiration for this from the work of Heather Smith (2010) who argues 
that the very heart of the critical feminist enterprise is that we recognize that learning is primarily 
about intersubjectivity and not objectivity. We do not conduct research in a vacuum; we produce 
important analyses through self-reflection; and we gain knowledge through a process of 
reflexivity. “Reflexivity is important … for explaining how we come to be gendered and sexual 
subjects who take part in the interactive processes through which we produce a shared sense of 
reality” (Rahman and Jackson, 2010, 165-66, as quoted in Keeble, 2016, 20). 
I acknowledge that men can be victims of sexual violence, just as women can be 
perpetrators. Nevertheless, the majority of cases involve women as the victims of men, and this 
thesis reflects that in its focus. I have struggled in this endeavour to separate rape from sex. Rape 
is a crime that is sexual in nature, but it is an act of violence, not sexuality. I have tried to 
maintain this understanding while thinking about the connections between sex and violence in 
rape. In my eyes it seems a perversion of our oldest natural instinct. The act of coupling or 
mating is an animal instinct that we have always carried with us. I have always found any 
suggested instinct toward violence as an alien feeling to which I cannot relate. Much of our 
culture revolves around our sexualities. Even marriage is a formalization of human coupling, to 
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celebrate a lasting bond between people. Much of our culture, be it art, poetry, music, and film, 
all relate back to our instincts in this way. But this is not what rape is. Rape is an attack that 
simply mirrors sex in its intimate contact between two people. In this, it perverts the values I see 
celebrated in our sexuality. It dehumanizes victims, destroying something to which we attribute 
great value. It takes away sexual agency, and demoralizes those who understand the personal and 
political worth of intimacy (see, for example, Keeble, 2016). 
What follows is a systematic analysis of select literature that explores the questions I 
raise. Why do men commit rape? How does this understanding translate to war rape? 
Furthermore, what is the connection between this and war itself? In each section I attempt to 
unravel one piece of this puzzle, and draw connections as I go. Although Smith (2010) argues 
that reflective writing can be seen (although wrongly) as anecdotal, seemingly unorganized, and 
even “messy,” my reflective analysis is clearly research-derived and systematically presented, 
because in most cases I choose insights from individual pieces of feminist literature to make my 
case point by point. 
 The second section attempts to provide historical context. Our understanding of rape in 
war has changed relatively rapidly within a span of the last 70 years. It is now recognized as 
contravening international law, not only as a war crime, but also a crime against humanity. I will 
begin with an overview of some historical examples of rape in war, both to set the context and to 
demonstrate different conditions under which sexual violence can occur. Following that, in the 
third section I will draw on feminist International Relations literature to situate the concepts of 
masculinity addressed in this thesis in a framework of militarization. This understanding of 
gender is crucial to the rest of the thesis.  
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In the fourth section I will narrow still further to explain the relevance of hegemonic 
masculinity in the framework established thus far, and how it can help to explain both aggression 
in war and sexual violence in war. A greater understanding of hegemonic masculinity is where I 
begin to find answers to my overall inquiry. Finally, in the fifth section I assess possible 
solutions to the problems posed by how my understanding has developed in the thesis. The 
understanding of masculinized social structures is troubling, but ultimately not insurmountable, 
and this section deals with possible changes to that effect. 
As I have alluded to thus far, this topic was difficult to approach. I find the question of 
identity impossible to escape. I was driven by a need to understand something that seemed so 
foreign to me, but that seemed to be entwined in our collective understanding of men. I could not 
understand what made men “men,” if it involved such atrocious undercurrents of violence. The 
portrayal of men in popular culture is often inscribed with violent tendencies, and this portrayal 
lends itself to real world definitions of masculinity. 
This issue has proven to be profoundly complex, but within an analysis of social gender 
structures it began to come clear to me that sexual violence in war is consequential. However, 
that does not mean it has to be accepted. Although we have taken steps from an international 
legal perspective through the prosecution of rape as an international crime, there is far more we 
can do by changing the dominant concepts that perpetuate rape in war. This dominant concept is 
hegemonic masculinity, and it is by changing this that we can change our expectations. When 
this is accomplished, I believe that we can then expect a reduction in sexual violence in war. 
II. Setting the Stage 
The act of rape has been around as long as humans have existed, and it seems that this 
has always been an accompanying feature of violent conflict. As long as humans have committed 
6 
 
acts of war, combatants have committed rape. The motives behind such acts seem to range from 
chaotic acts of violence within the landscape of armed conflict, to deliberate tactical choices on 
the part of commanders or state leaders. 
In this section I will outline the historical context of the discussion of sexual violence in 
war. I will do so by giving a few prominent examples of the current era from World War II up to 
the present along with some relevant associated statistics. I will then discuss the changes made in 
law around the subject, beginning with the code of conduct for soldiers in the United States, and 
finally with the efforts made by international organizations to address the problem. 
Sexual violence in armed conflict is defined in several ways. It is considered a weapon in 
and of itself, used to demoralize enemies and dilute ethnic populations. It is both a mass crime 
and an extremely individualistic one. It is a crime of terror. Yet it has only been recently 
recognized as a war crime in the last few decades (Ellis, 2006, 227). The development of rape as 
something separate from more commonly discussed acts of war (e.g. fighting or killing) has been 
a recent development in human history.  
To elaborate, before its establishment as a crime against humanity, rape was often 
considered one of the spoils of war. It has been classically illegal since the Lieber agreement in 
1863, wherein the United States officially laid out what rules of conduct soldiers would be held 
to during armed conflict. Rape was addressed in the Lieber code as a “crime of ‘troop 
discipline’” (Ellis, 2006, 227). The Lieber Code of conduct evolved into the first international 
laws of war through convention, as it was intended initially just as an American tool but later 
extended beyond this. The method of definition employed in this legal book very much depends 
on the language of women as victims because it cites the need to protect women so they would 
retain their honour. The different interpretations on the severity or how to deal with acts of rape 
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ranged from troop discipline to outright ignorance on the part of commanders, but there was 
nothing in terms of legal prosecution, whether locally or internationally. It was not until after 
World War II that we began considering the consequences that spoke to our humanity (Ellis, 
2006, 227-228). 
In our current time period I start my examination at the beginning of World War II. In 
December 1937, Japanese troops invaded the Chinese city of Nanking (sometimes Nanjing) in a 
brutal assault that would come to earmark war crime prosecutions in later tribunals in the Pacific 
theatre (Brook, 2001, 673). This event was collectively known as the Rape of Nanking, in 
recognition of both the overwhelming domination by the Japanese and the sheer amount of actual 
rape committed by combatants on the field. It was a massacre and although Japanese troops 
destroyed key documents at the end of the war, scholarly estimates put the number of dead 
around 300,000 in the city of Nanking (Brook, 2001, 681). Reports of widespread looting and 
rape were even more difficult to define in exact numbers, but the estimated number of rape 
victims (specifically women and girls) is between 20,000 and 80,000 over a period of several 
weeks (Fiske and Shackel, 2015, 124). 
This event was prosecuted in the eventual International Military Tribunals for the Far 
East (or Tokyo Trials) and was significant in that it addressed rape at all. This was of course, not 
the case for all examples of rape during World War II. As the war ended, the Soviet troops that 
conquered Berlin committed mass amounts of rape against German women. Estimates put the 
number of women and girls that were victims of rape in this example at around 130,000, of 
which ten percent are believed to have committed suicide (Messerschmidt, 2006, 706). These 
cases of rape were never prosecuted, likely due to the nature of the Soviet forces being part of 
the Allied victors at the end of the war. 
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 The conditions under which these two cases occurred were very different. In the Tokyo 
Trials, Japan was found to have committed a War of Aggression, and moreover, Japanese foreign 
minister Hirota Koki was found to be criminally negligent in not addressing the ongoing 
atrocities in Nanking (Brook, 2001, 683). In fact, despite the Tokyo Trials not being explicitly 
mandated to prosecute crimes of rape, the convenors chose to use these examples to prove the 
complicity of Japan’s aggression. Unwittingly these trials set an important precedent for the way 
we look at rape in war by showing some international consensus regarding rape as a terrible 
crime, and one worth prosecuting. 
This is in stark contrast to the assault on Berlin. The final push into Berlin was seen to be 
an act of the Allies ending the war against the Nazis. There was a sense of relief in the world as 
the Nazi regime came to an end. There is no record of the Soviets being given explicit instruction 
to commit mass acts of rape, but they were free to conduct themselves as they saw fit outside of 
battle. Messerschmidt notes that Stalin was known to be “amused by the idea of Red Army 
soldiers having ‘some fun’ after a hard war,” and although Messerschmidt acknowledges the fact 
that there was no explicit military strategy involving committing rape, he notes that there is a 
connection between this occurrence and an overall masculine strategy driving the war 
(Messerschmidt, 2006, 707). This strategy was one of domination, and it allowed for mass rapes 
due to its primary tools being violence, degradation, and humiliation. 
On top of the Rape of Nanking, the Japanese government was known to have placed over 
200,000 women and girls in camps for the purpose of sexual slavery in occupied areas. They 
were known as “comfort women,” and the camps were put in place for the Japanese troops to 
use. Unfortunately the Tokyo Trials did not include any acknowledgment of comfort women and 
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these were not among actions that were prosecuted. Comfort women are still seeking retribution 
and acknowledgement today (Ellis, 2006, 228). 
After the Second World War, there was a burgeoning development of international 
organizations, not the least of which is the United Nations (UN). The dialogue that sprang forth 
was of international human rights, and although not all member states have actively enforced 
these ambitious tenets, the emergence of the UN Declaration on Human Rights marks an 
emergence of collective goals. In 1949 the Geneva Convention dealing with the treatment of 
prisoners of war established the first protections against rape for women (Ellis, 2006, 229). 
The next examples were different for me, as I can remember them from my lifetime. The 
post-Cold War period was initially anticipated to be a period of de-escalation of conflict, and 
therefore a period of decreased war. This has not proven to be the case, and there are a few 
notable conflicts with mass amounts of rape. The ethnic conflict in Rwanda in 1994 posed a 
significant challenge for UN peacekeepers who were not authorized to engage in helping to stop 
the slaughter. Romeo Dallaire led this team, and was a witness to many atrocities. I had the 
privilege to hear him speak of these experiences in 2015. The horror that he conveyed was not 
the least of the factors that pushed me on the journey to this point of research. 
Sexual violence occurred en masse amid the context of genocide that was being 
committed by the Hutu tribe against the Tutsi people in the Rwandan conflict. Lee Ann Fujii 
(2009) describes a systematic approach by aggressors wherein they used government facilities 
and records to locate the residences of Tutsi families and would proceed to rape the women and 
girls and kill the men (Fujii, 2009, 89). 
In her research on Rwanda, Jennie Burnet (2012) places the number of women raped in 
that country at 49.4% of the population, but that in this frenzy of ethnic cleansing, women on 
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both sides of the tribal divide were likely to be victimized in this way. Burnet cites instances of 
forced relationships and marriage among these (Burnet, 2012, 98-99). Despite these 
“relationships,” Burnet emphasizes that rape was used as part of a conscious strategy by the 
perpetrators to “terrorize and control women, girls, and other civilians” (Burnet, 2012, 98). 
In 1994 the United Nations passed Security Council resolution S/RES/955 to establish the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). This resolution was an attempt to address 
the mass slaughter as a violation of international humanitarian law; however where the UN had 
failed to intercede to prevent or alleviate the violence as it occurred, this was somewhat of a 
stopgap solution. It was intended to demonstrate to the world that prosecution was a serious 
option, and therefore would act as a deterrent to those who would commit such mass atrocities.  
The inclusion of rape in the prosecution was initially left out, but the testimony of 
witnesses prompted the prosecution to investigate further. With the encouragement of the 
“Tribunal’s only woman judge, Navanethem Pillay,” new evidence was heard regarding sexual 
violence (Ellis, 2006, 232). Due to this late addition, the act of rape was redefined to include 
more than just acts involving forced penetration or even physical contact, and moreover this was 
the evidence that initially established that rape could be considered an act of genocide (Ellis, 
2006, 233). 
The ICTR was, however, another ad hoc tribunal as there was not yet a permanent court 
to deal with international crimes of this scale. Through the 1990s more sexual violence was 
occurring in the Bosnian conflict, as part of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The country 
of Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic state established as a home for (literally translated) “Southern 
Slavs” after displacement and depopulation had ravaged much of the European continent in 
World War II. Nevertheless ethnic conflicts emerged, culminating in the Bosnian war from 
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1992-1996. This example is notable again because of the sheer number of rape victims within the 
context of the war, but also because of the demonstrable systematic nature of sexual violence as 
a weapon of war. 
More than any other example in history, rape was employed as a tool for ethnic cleansing 
through the establishment of rape camps mandated by the government. The Serbian nationals 
who were responsible had the intent of diluting the ethnic populations of other groups by forced 
pregnancy. Although not limited to one particular ethnicity, the majority of these instances were 
committed by Serbs against Muslim women. The research of Snyder asserts that the historically 
patriarchal society of the region assigned ethnicity based on the lineage of the father, so forced 
pregnancy would effectively eliminate the racial heritage of the mother (Snyder, 2006, 189-190). 
Fiske and Shackel (2015, 124) argue that it is difficult to tell exact numbers of rape 
victims in the Bosnian conflict because the idea of ethnic dilution coupled with the existing 
social stigma of being a rape victim led to massive underreporting. They estimate the number of 
victims ranged from 25,000 – 50,000, but that most were raped more than once, and in fact many 
were raped daily during periods of captivity within rape camps. Moreover, a vast majority (96%) 
of these cases were accompanied by additional physical torture (Fiske and Shackel, 2015, 124). 
Again, the United Nations established an ad hoc tribunal for the prosecution of crimes committed 
in this war, and it was called the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) (Fiske and Shackel, 2015, 126). 
The ICTY added to legal understandings of sexual violence not only by connecting 
forced pregnancy to the nature of genocide, but also by establishing precedent for the 
prosecution of sexual violence as crimes against humanity (Ellis, 2006, 234 - 235). These notions 
played heavily into the establishment of statutes for the International Criminal Court. 
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The most recent example is the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that 
began in 1998. Stacey Banwell (2014) writes of this conflict as unique in the sense that it began 
after the two aforementioned tribunals (ICTR & ICTY), and on top of this, after the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998. As a result, the entrenchment of laws 
against sexual violence in war should have been much more understood, and yet this has 
apparently not deterred actors from committing these crimes in the DRC. Banwell cites Laura 
Sjoberg in stating that it is an illusion “to think that an immunity principle actually protects 
women,” in the context of women as non-combatants (Banwell, 2014, 49). Although many 
attempts have been made to initiate peace processes, the violence is ongoing in the region, and 
that includes the act of rape. Banwell gives multiple examples of research into the numbers of 
victims, but presents no single number. Each estimate is based on a specific year or range of 
years, but nevertheless each one encompasses tens of thousands (Banwell, 2014, 48). 
As stated previously, the process by which our understanding of rape as a war crime 
changed very gradually. The Tokyo Trials prosecuted crimes of rape against some despite the 
fact that it was not specifically in the mandate of the tribunal. Nevertheless, the sexual violence 
committed by the Japanese was atrocious enough to gain the attention of the court, establishing 
that this could become the focus of prosecution in the future. Unfortunately this tribunal did not 
prosecute the forced prostitution of the comfort women (Ellis, 2006, 228). The focus was 
beginning to be on sexual violence, but it was barely there. 
Ellis asserts that it was a slow process of acknowledgment by the various international 
prosecutions that led to the eventual inclusion of rape in international law. Various changes in 
the definition of rape came in the form of different lines of inquiry: for example whether forced 
penetration was necessary, whether proof was required, or whether consent could somehow be 
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demonstrated by the defense (Ellis, 2006, 229-230). The ICTR and ICTY were the first courts to 
prosecute rape as a war crime, and the ICTR was the first to acknowledge rape as a crime against 
humanity (Banwell, 2014, 45). This acknowledgement marks a shift in our perception of rape as 
a war crime. These tribunals were in the 1990s, but crimes against humanity had been 
established decades earlier in 1949 in the Geneva Conventions (Ellis, 2006, 226). Ellis cites the 
existence of the ICC in its current form as testament to how far we have come in the last century. 
We have made important strides in defining rape, and now have these definitions codified in 
international law (Ellis, 2006, 239). 
Overall it has been a journey of improvement for humanity as the changes in the last 
century are relatively rapid within the entire history of our society. This is fitting with many 
other social changes that took place during the twentieth century. Just like other aspects of social 
change, however, any changes seem to be tenuous and progress is far from over. It is through 
acts of acknowledgement that change happens. However we must look deeper than simply the 
atrocious nature of these acts to discover the true gendered root of this problem. 
III. Seeing War as Gendered 
How gender is defined often depends on the particular theoretical perspective of any 
given researcher. R.W. Connell (1995, 67) calls the task of defining gender impossible when 
attempting to lay out a scientific definition. Instead a scientific method of investigation lends 
itself better to defining gender relations which points to understanding masculinities and 
femininities. Masculinities can then be defined as “configurations of practice structured by 
gender relations.” Thus, “masculinity as an object of knowledge is always masculinity-in-
relation” (Connell, 1995, 44). 
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I have come to find this to be an important starting point for my study because I am using 
one form of understanding masculinity as a lens through which to analyze sexual violence in 
war. It is crucial to remember that hegemonic masculinity exists only in relationships of gender. 
This applies to all things that can be demonstrably “gendered,” and in this section I will lay out 
some of these relationships to explain the gendered nature of war itself.  
Acts of sexual violence occur in war, and just as war is a political act so too then are acts 
of sexual violence in this context. In all of the forms it can take, rape in war is always about 
power, not sex, and as such we will need to first define the gender relations within the concept of 
war itself. This section will take a broader examination of the gender dynamics within war before 
I discuss the more specific dynamics of rape. 
As we have historically associated war with manhood, it is easy to begin with this idea of 
war as masculine. Again I cite my own experiences in that it seemed obvious enough to me that 
the lay observer might be inclined to just agree that war is clearly masculine and leave it at that. 
Despite the concept of militarized masculinity being new to me in my research process, it was 
not wholly unfamiliar. However, with the revelation that masculinity depends on a relationship 
with an “other” (femininity in this case) my understanding began to grow. 
Maya Eichler (2014) looks into the concept of militarized masculinity as an important 
factor in our understanding of the connections between the masculine gender and war. She states 
that “Militarized masculinity, at its most basic level, refers to the assertion that traits 
stereotypically associated with masculinity can be acquired and proven through military service 
or action, and combat in particular” (Eichler, 2014, 81). This notion recognizes the historical fact 
that most actors in war have always been (and continue to be) men. Men have been soldiers and 
combatants as well as political leaders inciting war (or acting in self defense), whereas women 
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have more traditionally been part of the “home front,” representing the alternative to men in 
battle (Cohn, 2013, 1). 
Carol Cohn sheds light on this simplistic analysis, and reminds us that the experience of 
war and relationship to war is in fact quite varied for different women across time (Cohn, 2013, 
1). “‘Women,’ of course are not a monolithic group” (Cohn, 2013, 2), but in fact half of the 
population of the planet, with many factors contributing to each individual identity. The fact that 
they are women is just one shared trait. All of these differences illustrate that we must be careful 
not to generalize, even when talking about women and their relationship to war, because “the 
diversity of women’s experiences of and relations to war is due to both diversity among women 
and diversity among wars” (Cohn, 2013, 2). 
Cohn goes on to define gender in a complementary way to Connell, in that it is a way of 
“categorizing, ordering, and symbolizing power, of hierarchically structuring relationships,” 
(Cohn, 2013, 3). In this, we see that gender is in fact about power relations (and therefore 
political) themselves, and these relations depend on a hierarchy of norms associated with 
masculine and feminine.  
J. Ann Tickner (1992) presents a way of looking at war as masculine by addressing the 
security dilemma as raised by International Relations scholars, arguing that the capabilities of a 
state (in this case security) are measurable primarily in relation to other states. The security 
dilemma is that more security for one means less security for others as it is inherently a zero sum 
game. Tickner references the foundational work of Kenneth Waltz’s Man, The State, and War 
for this explanation (Tickner, 1992, 35). She brings gender into her explanation in a few ways. 
First, Tickner discusses criticisms of Hans Morgenthau’s seminal work, Political Man, 
which, as a foundation for much of International Relations theory, is only a “partial 
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representation of human nature, abstracted from the behaviour of men in positions of public 
power,” (Tickner, 1992, 37). This essentializes humanity down to a specific prescription of 
maleness that does not in fact represent the experiences of all people. Tickner then defines this 
notion as hegemonic masculinity, and asserts that the dominance of a masculine concept applied 
to international relations necessarily has a “devalued femininity” that accompanies it, furthering 
evidence of a relational construct (Ticker, 1992, 37 -38). 
To further illustrate her argument, Tickner uses examples to demonstrate that the 
violence of war is not a natural feature of men, as some might assume, but as a result of a social 
construct. “Because military recruiters cannot rely on violent qualities in men, they appeal to 
manliness and patriotic duty” (Tickner, 1992, 40). The appeal to a masculine (or simply not a 
feminine) sexual identity is a primary motivator in cases of recruitment, training, and even battle. 
Our traditional association between men and violence is not dependent “on men’s innate 
aggressiveness, but on the construction of a gendered identity that places heavy pressure on 
soldiers to prove themselves as men” (Tickner, 1992, 40). 
I have not found it to be a difficult leap in logic to connect all of this emphasis on 
masculinity in military training to the prevalence of sexual violence in war. As easily as we can 
now demonstrate that it is constructions of gender that are used to bring out violence in male 
soldiers, I can say that it must be a furtherance of the same that leads to war rape. Just as war is 
an act of violent dominance, so too is rape. With these understandings it has become clearer to 
me that my initial question was leading much deeper than simply “what causes men to commit 
rape during war?” 
E.L. Zurbriggen (2010, 538) tells us that hegemonic masculinity is an underlying factor 
for the very existence of war, and that it is this connection that leads to the prevalence of rape 
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just as much as it leads to the existence of war at all. Similarly to Tickner above, Zurbriggen 
asserts that traditional masculinity relies on existing as an antithesis to femininity. These include 
inexpressiveness (of emotions), independence, and aggression. Moreover, she argues that being 
masculine relies on an avoidance of being seen as feminine (Zurbriggen, 2010, 540). 
Zurbriggen points out the prevalence of these ideals in military recruitment material, and 
the value placed on these concepts in appreciating what a soldier should be. “Status and 
Achievement, Toughness and Aggression, Restricted Emotionality, Self-Reliance, and 
Dominance/Power/Control,” are five dimensions she identifies as creating the best possible 
soldier (Zurbriggen, 2010, 542). We can see now that these characteristics of a soldier overlap 
pretty plainly with her ideas of hegemonic masculinity, and in the same vein it becomes even 
clearer that these connect to notions of war. 
Indeed war itself as a political act is one of dominance. It necessarily requires a move of 
power by one actor asserting itself on another. War is an act of aggression in most cases, 
although a state of war exists for those on defense as well. Nevertheless it is important to 
recognize the parallel between power and dominance in war, and its emphasis on traditional 
masculinity. Moreover, as I will talk more about in the next section, we need to recognize the 
parallel between these factors and sexual violence. 
The concept of a militarized masculine citizenry is not new to the twentieth century. J. 
Ann Tickner references Machiavelli’s citizen warrior and the emphasis that he placed on the 
virtue thereof. In fact, Machiavelli employed this notion of virtue to the final degree of giving 
one’s life for one’s country being the most noble thing one could do (Tickner, 1992, 39). Tickner 
also connects Machiavelli’s emphasis on the necessity of an “other” to the “oppositional 
relationship to a devalued femininity” (Tickner, 1992, 38), just as Zurbriggen emphasized. In 
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fact, Machiavelli explicitly states that fortune (or chance, luck, or fate) is “a woman [and that it 
is] necessary […] to conquer her by force.” This narrative relies heavily on notions of masculine 
and feminine to back up his claims. This is true, however, of our idea of war today. 
Laura Sjoberg (2013) describes the gendered nature ascribed even to technology of war, 
weapons, or even tactics themselves. She tells us that certain “offensive developments” have 
been “celebrated for their link to masculinity,” and goes on to cite examples of bigger better 
bombs (Sjoberg, 2013, 227). The capacity for destruction is one aspect of this, and fits with the 
notion of dominance prescribed to masculinity. On top of this, Sjoberg discusses the penetrative 
nature of certain weapons. 
The notion of penetration is classically tied to all war, and more than just dominance, it is 
an act of inserting oneself in another. An act of invasion or annexation is the act of one state 
penetrating another or even subsuming part (or all) of it. The parallels here become easy to draw 
between not only power and dominance, but the hierarchy of gender as it is tied to sex. Just as 
war is an act of dominance, so too is it an act of penetration, and a comparison to sexual violence 
in war becomes especially notable in a study such as this. 
The idea that tactics are gendered becomes easier to understand at this point. Just as 
gender relies on a hierarchy to exist as a framework, war is the large scale attempt at realizing 
that framework. The reliance on masculinity is such that all actors believe the victor will be the 
side that is best able to embody these traits. 
The balance between dominance and submissiveness in war are clearly tied to notions of 
masculine and feminine, but just as war is tied to the masculine ideal, peace is tied to the 
feminine. Carol Cohn describes this as an example of “symbolic gender coding” (Cohn, 2013, 
12). What this means is that the concepts of war and peace are gendered by the fact of being 
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associated with traits commonly associated with masculine and feminine, respectively. Just as 
the masculine element is associated with action, the feminine is linked to passivity. The same 
two-sided coin exists for toughness and softness, violence and pacifism, and independence and 
interdependence. Moreover, on top of all of these examples, it becomes clear that the feminine is 
defined relationally to the masculine. As a concept it seems less distinct than it otherwise would 
have at first, as it depends on the other for substance. In this we see that the action of gendering 
concepts itself falls prey to being a gendered idea, as it relies on the same hierarchy. 
These two interrelated roles play themselves out in the practice of war. Traditionally 
women have not been combatants in war (although this is not universally true, and there are 
examples of women participating in war as combatants). There are examples of women assisting 
in wars in many ways: as intelligence officers, as message carriers, as soldiers, nurses, etc. There 
are examples of women being complicit in sending armies to war from positions of political 
power. By and large though, women are seen to occupy a space often called the home front 
(Cohn, 2013, 1). Their role in these situations is to keep up morale, tend to family life, take on 
the working roles of men that have left for war, or even ensure raising children for the next 
generation of soldiers, should the need arise. 
This reveals one more aspect of the gendered nature of war, as we see the broader picture 
of women as protected and men as protectors. Protection of the innocent (family) is a masculine 
trait assigned to men just as much as any other. It is in a fashion, counter to notions of 
aggression, but serves to achieve the same result of motivating men to fight. The above examples 
of men as protector and women as protected on the home front are classical examples derived 
from various wartime rhetoric and propaganda. 
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War is indeed a terrible aspect of humanity. The literature discussed so far suggests that it 
exists as a result of our social constructs, such as gender. Despite a general understanding of war 
as something we collectively hate and fear, it persists in human society. This is reflective of the 
persistence of the masculine idealization being discussed. Carol Cohn even touches on this, as 
she states that “the masculine is valued so much more highly than the feminine,” (Cohn, 2013, 
12) in relationship to methods of war being preferred tools to methods of nonviolence, such as 
diplomacy. At the same time, she obviously recognizes that war is a regrettable method, even if 
it is seen as effective.  
It seems a certain irony, then, that concepts we value so highly, like peace, are relegated 
to a position less preferable to war. Any political actor in a position of leadership responsible for 
war will state that war is necessary only as a means for achieving peace, and yet this rhetoric 
seems to be at odds with the reality. If one is truly preferred, why is the other so valued to the 
point of being a dominant idea in our society? 
This conflict of ideas is what cements the idea of gender being the basis for the 
prevalence of war. As Zurbriggen’s contribution seeks to expose, although men are trained to 
exemplify traits that are called masculine, their natural tendency is not toward violence. I find 
common ground with this suggestion, as it has informed an understanding of where I fall on the 
spectrum of masculinity. As stated at the outset of this analysis, I cannot easily relate to feelings 
of violence. 
The action of the state on its population in creating a military relies heavily on these 
notions of masculine virtue, and in doing so is identifiable as an act of power. This is then 
identifiable as a political act, as it is also a means to an end. Presumably, as a military is created, 
it is intended for a purpose, even if just for security. War is a political act, and the creation of an 
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army is a political act, and so following this path of logic I can conclude this section by stating 
that I now see rape in war as an extension of the politics involved in privileging war. 
IV. Conceptualizing Hegemonic Masculinity 
What makes a man “a man” is a complicated question. The discussions I see in popular 
news media seem to suggest that for many people today, the idea is simply one of biology. The 
rising awareness of transgender individuals has called into question the idea that the adult male 
human is a man, as if it was an open and shut definition. We are seeing that it is much more 
complicated than this, as gender plays a huge role in our identity. Depending on methodology 
used (or what discipline of study to which we are referring), this may seem irrelevant. For 
example, medical doctors may prefer to focus simply on biology due to the physical components 
of the body being the primary purview of their concern. Psychologists may take the opposite 
approach as gender identity can have a powerful impact on mental health. From a point of study 
in the social sciences we know that the ways humans identify each other and self-identify is of 
huge importance to understanding our actions. 
A study of sexual violence in war is a multi-levelled study into power relations, and as 
such it is of crucial importance to understand the identities involved if we are to understand the 
actions taking place. As stated in the previous section, war is intricately connected to the concept 
of masculinity. It is our emphasis on dominant notions of masculinity that bring out violence in 
soldiers. In this section I will flesh out the connection even further to place acts of sexual 
violence within the same framework. I will demonstrate that, conceptually, hegemonic 
masculinity is crucial to explaining the acts of sexual violence that we find so abhorrent, yet that 
seem to continue to exist within the state of war that persists in the world. 
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The term “hegemonic masculinity” was coined by R. W. Connell and discussed in the 
book Masculinities (1995) within a larger framework of multiple masculinities across a spectrum 
of culture and time. Connell’s study relies on (and suggests heavily) the understanding that there 
is no singular masculine, and that we cannot point to an example of an embodiment of this. The 
hegemonic aspect of the term is derived from Antonio Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony, as 
it describes the dominance between classes based on Marxist theory. One important aspect that 
Gramsci brought to the idea is that it includes an element of consent, wherein the dominated 
class or group consent to their subordination. 
This holds true in cases of hegemonic masculinity, as it exists through a mechanism of 
social consent. Men, in a position of privilege in this structure, allow for this particular 
hegemony, but women are complicit in this consent as well (Connell, 1995, 79). Moreover, on 
the spectrum of masculinities, the subordinated forms of masculinity are complicit in their 
domination as well. With that stated, for the purposes of my thesis, hegemonic masculinity is a 
tool used to understand a social structure with the explicit goal of understanding the horrible acts 
of sexual violence that occur during war. 
Connell defines hegemonic masculinity as “the configuration of gender practice which 
embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of the patriarchy,” 
relating to the dominant societal position men hold (Connell, 1995, 77). The emphasis on 
“currently accepted” is crucial to understanding the nature of the concept, as it is obviously a 
changing idea through time. Moreover, this reveals the emancipatory element of the concept 
itself. As an idea it is possible to change for the better, as it is changing itself. Connell even 
acknowledges hegemony as “a historically mobile relation” (Connell, 1995, 77). “Men no more 
than women are chained to the gender patterns they have inherited.” (Connell, 1995, 86) 
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The concept grew in popularity in gender studies, as Connell noted when revisiting the 
concept along with James W. Messerschmidt (2005). They call it “a widely used framework for 
research and debate about men and masculinities” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, 835), 
although they note among other criticisms of the concept that it is difficult to place a model of 
hegemonic masculinity on any one given person. This reflects Connell’s (1995) thesis of 
multiple masculinities. The idea of a masculine ideal is a concept that means different things to 
different people, so is impossible to apply all traits within such a framework to any one person. 
In terms of the lived realities of men, no single man will ever embody a list of ideal masculine 
traits, especially as opinion on these traits will vary. No ultimate example of the personification 
of hegemonic masculinity exists. 
Connell and Messerschmidt also point out that as the concept of hegemonic masculinity 
has gained momentum and been used more widely “in the huge literature concerned with 
masculinity, there is a great deal of conceptual confusion as well as a great deal of 
essentializing” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, 836). They assert that it would be 
irresponsible to deny this. I acknowledge that this is a weakness within the concept in one sense; 
however, I maintain that there is strength in the knowledge that such a broad concept cannot 
literally apply to any single individual. In fact it only serves to reinforce the fluid nature of 
hegemonic gender concepts. Indeed they touch on the inherent negotiated femininity that comes 
with a social structure such as this (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, 840). As noted 
previously, masculinity is primarily defined as a structure in relation to the accompanying 
structure of femininity, and so my understanding has grown to include the idea that if one is 
hegemonic then so too is the other. Hierarchies of gender rely on consent of those within them to 
reinforce them and allow them to exist. Hegemonic masculinity is the explanation of this idea, 
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and logically it seems that if masculinity comes with a relation to femininity, then this femininity 
is hegemonic as well. The two ideas are interrelated. 
It is a notable criticism of hegemonic masculinity that it is purely a way of exemplifying 
negative characteristics and used to explain violent behaviour (Connell and Messerschmidt, 
2005, citing Collier, 1998, and Martin, 1998). It is important to acknowledge this, as my thesis 
certainly veers into a range of analysis that relies on these characteristics to explain sexual 
violence in war, and even war itself. However, I fall back on the fact that in seeking to promote a 
reduction in violence it is important to understand the root causes. Moreover I do not believe this 
criticism is enough to rule out the functionality of hegemonic masculinity as a lens through 
which we can analyze sexual violence. 
Zurbriggen has already shown us the connection necessary between masculine virtues 
and the effectiveness of a soldier. One aspect of this is “restricted emotionality” that benefits a 
soldier, otherwise disinclined to kill; killing is a task necessary in war (Zurbriggen, 2010, 543). I 
find it is not a difficult leap in logic to see how this detachment from empathy may lead a soldier 
to at least have reduced inhibitions about committing rape. Zurbriggen’s primary argument is 
that rape and war both share a root cause in “masculine socialization” (Zurbriggen, 2010, 544), 
and this fits with other literature. However, just as Zurbriggen suggests that we cannot eliminate 
rape from war as long as hegemonic masculinity persists, I suggest that Connell’s definition of it 
as a historically mobile concept undermines Zurbriggen’s claim, showing her understanding to 
be incomplete. The very fact that the dominant factors of masculinity change over time is the key 
to this understanding. 
Rape is an overwhelming reality in war, as discussed in the previous section. It is 
something that we abhor, and in fact our response to such crimes has changed over time. Yet 
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these acts continue to occur. As Tickner (1992) has suggested that violent qualities do not exist 
inherently in men, and so they must be emphasized rigorously in the process of training soldiers, 
she notes that “in basic training the term of utmost derision is to be called a girl or lady” 
(Tickner, 1992, 40). The suggestion here is that soldiers strive to prove themselves as men, 
fighting to better embody what it means to be a “soldier,” namely embodying characteristics of 
aggression and manliness. However, this entire premise relies on the gendered notion of women 
as victims. It suggests to the soldier in training, that if they are to continue to be like women, 
they will not be victors, but victims. As these concepts all rely on a hierarchical relationship, this 
is the opposite side of the coin in how soldiers are trained to look at women. The explicit 
suggestion is that the soldiers will be victims if they continue to embody feminine characteristics 
(as relational to ideal masculine characteristics), but the implicit suggestion is that women are 
victims. From my own understanding it seems a logical progression follows, from being trained 
to see women as victims to victimizing women in war.  
Laura Sjoberg and Jessica Peet (2011) confirm this with their suggestion that the 
construction of an enemy has as much to do with gender as the construction of the home front. 
“It is important to construct the enemy as something other than the masculine ideal,” (Sjoberg 
and Peet, 2001, 176) for this ideal must belong to one’s own military in order to achieve victory. 
At the same time, the relational aspect of this gender arrangement must inherently include a 
feminine side, and this is represented by the state itself. Sjoberg and Peet connect the ideal of 
protector as masculine, to the state as feminine, but in doing so, they make another important 
connection to the overall strategy of attacking women. If masculinity is tied so heavily to victory 
in the minds of soldiers, and this is related to protecting the home, then by feminizing the other 
masculinity of enemy they can ensure victory. This feminization in this case takes on the form of 
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attacking that which the enemy is attempting to protect. “One way they do this is to render 
opponents’ men incapable of performing their own masculinity by targeting, killing, and 
humiliating ‘their’ women” (Sjoberg and Peet, 2011, 176) 
The work of Lisa S. Price (2001) suggests that the act of rape in war is not an evil act in 
the supernatural sense of the word, but a human sort of evil, in that men committing rape act out 
of “comprehensible motives” (Price, 2001, 212). Although her assertion that war rape is 
committed by ordinary men (as opposed to caricatures of evil) is upsetting to my sense of 
morality, I can see within it the possibility of change. Moreover, it suggests that we are on a 
corrective path already, acknowledging rape as a crime in war settings, and having increased 
severity of prosecution and punishment. Price emphasizes that “the construction of masculinity 
under militarized state nationalism [that] predisposes men to be sexually violent does not negate 
the agency of the individual soldier-rapist. And where there is agency there must be 
responsibility” (Price, 2001, 225). 
Indeed this is an important aspect of situating rape in war. It is acknowledged as a crime 
against humanity and a crime of genocide, but each act of rape remains extremely personal and 
individualistic. The terms of genocide and crimes against humanity may in fact obscure this fact 
in our minds, as they denote large scale atrocities. Certainly rape as it occurs in war fit within 
these definitions of mass atrocity; however, it remains important to remember the individual 
agency involved. 
Moreover, in a thesis such as this one, that seeks to connect a fairly generalized social 
structure, as is hegemonic masculinity, it is easy to overlook the smallest scale. Once again, this 
viewpoint lends itself to acknowledging the nature of the task at hand, as having a goal of 
positive social change. If it is a large scale hierarchy of traditional gender roles that we are 
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addressing, it is easy to see how entrenched the status quo is. However, with an 
acknowledgement that individuals matter, the problem is not quite so grim. 
Kimberley Hutchings (2007) adds to our understanding of “othering” that is necessary in 
the process of creating a hegemonic gender role. She addresses the fact that in valorizing certain 
versions of masculinity, we exclude not only women, but subordinated men as well. In her 
example this includes homosexual men (Hutchings, 2007, 392). This acknowledges the way in 
which men are victimized by hegemonic masculinity. Men are victimized in the sense that 
expectations of gender are attributed to biological sex, and thus restrictive, not just for 
homosexual men, but for all men. As in the aforementioned examples describing violence as not 
inherent to men, the restrictive nature of dominant masculinities is projected on to men by 
society. 
In this understanding it is notable that not all sexual violence in war is perpetrated by 
men, nor are all victims women. Paul Kirby (2013, 95) cites a report by the US Department of 
Justice suggesting that 9 percent of victims of rape and sexual assault between 1992 and 2000 
were male. These reports are based on domestic crime and not sexual violence in war, and it is 
cited to suggest that more attention needs to be paid to the sexual victimization of men in war. 
However, Kirby also states “Rape and sexual violence are acts overwhelmingly carried out by 
men against women. This much is widely accepted” (Kirby, 2013, 95). 
An understanding of the role of hegemonic masculinity in war rape has proven to be 
quintessential to the overarching narrative of the problems I have raised. As is apparent to me at 
this point, hegemonic masculinity is tied heavily to the militarization of masculinity discussed in 
the previous section. The dominance of the social structures we call gender go far beyond simply 
expectations of how to act in society. They dominate our actions, and our understandings of the 
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very same actions. Moreover, it should be clear that not only do hegemonic gender roles 
dominate our politics, locally and internationally, but they are political in their very nature, as 
they are a demonstrable form of power relation. 
Masculine and feminine notions are concepts that rely on power balance between them 
by their very nature. These terms have been traditionally connected to the two sexes, as it was 
assumed gender always corresponded with biology. In actual fact sex denotes biology and body 
parts, whereas gender is the part of an identity that corresponds with notions of masculine and 
feminine. Masculinity and femininity are also attributed to many actions and attitudes that 
humans exhibit. As such, they have become a paradigm by which we identify ourselves and each 
other. Many rely on their comfortable understanding of their own femininity or masculinity to 
define who they are in the world, but in doing so we all perpetuate this dominance of these 
concepts, and in this we project our own understandings onto one another. 
It is in this projection that militaries exist within masculine normativity. The reliance on 
traditional masculine traits becomes the norm for militaries, and in turn militaries themselves 
behave en masse within the expected frameworks of masculine expectations. As soldiers are 
trained to exist more and more heavily within a framework of traditional masculinity, which 
contains within itself the dominance of the feminine, it can be no surprise that soldiers commit 
acts of rape. Eileen Zurbriggen concludes that “as long as there continues to be a need (real or 
perceived) for soldiers and war, rape can never be eliminated” (Zurbriggen, 2010, 545). She 
notes that this is distressing because all developed societies continue to value state security first 
above all else, and consequently place their faith very highly in the infrastructure of institutions 
of war in order to achieve peace and security. I suggest that although this pattern is indeed 
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disturbing and overwhelmingly entrenched in most of global society, we do have the tools to 
change our situation. 
V. “Demilitarizing” Masculinity 
It is without a doubt at this point in my analysis that the underlying social structure of 
hegemonic masculinity is highly connected to sexual violence in war. It encompasses our 
traditional values of what makes men “men,” but fails to fully answer that question. This 
question was a driving force behind my research, as I found it quite alien that concepts that 
seemed so natural to some men were so conflicted in my mind. A culture that celebrates violence 
does not resonate with me, nor does competition or dominance. On the other hand, I found it 
repugnant that concepts I valued in myself or in people in general could be seen as gendered. I 
refer to ideas such as independence or logical thinking, neither of which I had previously thought 
to be masculine or gendered.  
Moreover, I have always placed a high value on developing a strong emotional 
intelligence, but did not see this as exclusive to other traits in myself. I saw them as 
interconnected, and not in terms of an oppositional relationship, as are concepts of masculine and 
feminine. I suppose now that this means I have always rejected traditional masculinity as a 
driving force in my life.  
Choosing to investigate sexual violence was choosing to look into the most unrelatable 
concept from my perspective, as it was beyond my comprehension to how it could exist, 
especially on such large scales. Lisa S. Price assures us that “a common response to egregious 
violence, especially sexual violence, is incomprehension” (Price, 2001, 211), thus confirming 
that I am probably not anomalous. 
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Sexual violence in war is dependent on many factors, not the least of which is hegemonic 
masculinity. It seems overwhelmingly the case that we must challenge the assumptions of gender 
that dominate our society if we hope to remedy this problem, although there must remain an 
emphasis on the importance of the actions of individuals. We can see that sexual violence exists 
as a by-product of the overarching structure of gender; however addressing it presents a whole 
new challenge. 
Maya Eichler (2014) addresses the militarized nature of masculinity. We use the term 
“militarized masculinity,” to explain the gendered nature of war, and how traits we associate 
with masculinity are necessary for war. Indeed this fits with much of the research examined 
within the scope of this thesis thus far. However, “militarized masculinity” has contained within 
the term itself an important clue. The choice of phrasing has “militarized” as an adjective, 
modifying “masculinity,” the subject. The inherent suggestion is that masculinity can exist in 
other forms, and although this has already been apparent in the works of Connell, it is Eichler’s 
suggestion of demilitarizing masculinity that holds the most promise for actual change. 
The necessity for amelioration of war rape has been emphasized throughout this thesis, 
but Eichler narrows it down to one specific change. Her suggestions for action on this front 
include a rejection of this militarization by men. She suggests men become active in peace 
movements. Moreover she cites Miriam Schroer-Hippel in suggesting that a responsibility for 
demilitarization be placed on peace initiatives by promoting “multiple acceptable ways to be a 
man, reduce gender hierarchies, and demilitarize masculinity.” This must be accomplished by 
challenging gender dichotomies and hierarchies, and by denying privilege to “militarized or 
masculinized experiences, such as those of male veterans” (Eichler, 2014, 89). 
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It is difficult to simply suggest things like these be emphasized or encouraged without an 
idea of how this is supposed to unfold. Moreover, the initial criticism that rises to the surface is 
that this relies heavily on essentialism of men in general. It is a view that simply states men 
doing something different will effect change. I take issue, as it seems likely that men involved in 
security professions would cite peace as their ultimate goal, albeit within the structure of state 
security apparatus. This can be seen as paradoxical, but the situation exists nonetheless. 
On top of this, Eichler’s suggestion that we reduce the valorization of activities related to 
soldiers or veterans approaches the issue from the wrong direction. If anything, the valorization 
of such activities by society is a by-product of the status quo of hegemonic masculinity. 
Moreover, it is crucial to remember the significance of how concepts of gender are embedded 
within people’s ways of self-identifying. With this in mind, I see it as likely that we valorize the 
soldier because we see soldiers as necessary. Moreover, they are in fact real people with families 
and friends. I find it unlikely that a mourning family will do anything but valorize a fallen family 
member. It also seems more likely from a broader perspective that society as a whole will 
rationalize the actions of soldiers by celebrating them as heroes, as the alternative relies on a 
release of values of national security. 
Indeed, Eichler’s suggestions are easy to criticize as too simple, but at the same time, she 
hits an important note of truth. First of all, she couples the need for demilitarizing masculinity 
with the “demilitarization of femininities that support militarized masculinities—be they patriotic 
mothers, loyal military wives, or female soldiers” (Eichler, 2014, 89). This connects the 
traditional acts of peace activism as they already exist to the disruption of militarized gender 
roles. This frames her other suggestions within a realistic context.  
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Zurbriggen suggests alternatively that a compartmentalization model of training soldiers 
may disrupt traditional training regimens. This suggestion is that soldiers be trained in self 
defense or group defense instead of aggressive tactics, and so fight only when necessary. Along 
with this, they should be trained to be “gentlemen” in all other aspects of behaviour (Zurbriggen, 
2010, 545). Although this suggestion is clearly gendered in itself, Zurbriggen’s thesis was 
especially grim in suggesting that it is unlikely we will convince the world at large not to fight 
wars, and so her idea of compartmentalization works within the existing frameworks. 
To suggest that soldiers be taught to be gentlemanly relies on gendered notions, both that 
soldiers are masculine and that soldiers are protectors. However, this suggestion works within 
the notion of change embedded within the concept of hegemonic masculinity. As Connell’s 
definition called it the “currently accepted” model of the masculine norm, Zubriggen is basically 
suggesting the changing of accepted masculinity. This is an important first step, and Zurbriggen 
attributes the real world application of techniques such as these to the reduction of sexual 
violence in conflict, but admits that it might not always work well. Sexual violence, as she points 
out, continues to be prevalent in all branches of the US military. 
Both Eichler (2014) and Zurbriggen (2010) emphasize the connections between gender, 
war, and rape in war. As Eichler concludes, “we need to acknowledge that men and masculinities 
are militarized, not inherently militaristic. The link between militarism and men is socially made 
rather than biologically given” (Eichler, 2014, 90), a suggestion I find most gratifying at the end 
of this thesis. I find in this the validation of my own standpoint, as well as hope for change. 
Indeed, Eichler suggests that the diversity and changing nature of these ideas are of importance 
in our effort to overcome the problems that come with them. This fits with my interpretation of 
hegemonic masculinity as changing. 
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R. W. Connell cites the work On War by Carl von Clausewitz in defining war as “a social 
technology of rationalized violence on the largest scale possible” (Connell, 1995, 192). Indeed 
war could be seen as a social construction based on the conclusions listed herein, of the existence 
of war being based on the emergence of current hegemonic masculinity. In emphasizing certain 
traits of humanity, we created a system by which political actions on that scale were not only 
possible, but inevitable. As society became more organized on an international level, 
bureaucratic institutionalisation of masculine notions allowed for war to exist on the scale we 
saw in the twentieth century.  As Connell notes, “fascism was a naked reassertion of male 
supremacy in societies that had been moving toward equality for women” (Connell, 1995, 193). 
The triumph over fascism changed the course of hegemonic masculinity in that century and led 
us to the point we are at now. 
When I began this path of research, I did not expect my understanding of war rape to 
become so dependent on an understanding of war itself, but I cannot help to land at a similar 
point of conclusion as Zurbriggen. If I am suggesting that war rape occurs because of entrenched 
notions of masculinity, then it has become too clear that war exists as such a frequent occurrence 
for the same reason. The role of soldiers in raping was the first way I looked at this problem, but 
it became increasingly clear that there were more and more levels to investigate. I felt 
overwhelmed by the scope of what I had opened up. 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming nature of the frequency of rape in war pushed me 
onward and I believe this line of inquiry to be very important, as this is a problem we should be 
able to solve. Just as the scholarship around the subject seems to indicate, I was motivated by an 
overall distaste for violence. 
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Tickner’s (1992) piece describes the Women’s International Peace Conference in 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, in 1985. She tells us that there were many disagreements based on 
the perspectives brought to the conference by people from all over the world. These differences 
were due to many socio-economic factors and were reflective not only of differences in priority, 
but also of different ways of looking at the problems in question. Put simply, “Western middle 
class women” were concerned with nuclear war, whereas “Third World women” were more 
concerned with “structural violence associated with imperialism, militarism, racism, and 
sexism.” Essentially there were divisions within the meeting that prioritized security different 
and disagreed on what problems needed to be addressed. Most importantly though, Tickner notes 
that “all agreed that security meant nothing if it was built on others’ insecurity” (Tickner, 1992, 
54, 55). 
I highlight this, because it represents a relational opposite to the traditional notion of the 
zero-sum game in the security dilemma posed by realist scholars of International Relations. The 
idea that an entire conference could agree that security for all is the only true security flies in the 
face of the conventional understanding of security. This highlights a positive hope for me, and it 
demonstrates why security has been re-conceptualized by feminists in the field of International 
Relations. 
With a deeper understanding of the concepts discussed in this thesis, I believe humanity 
as a whole can greatly reduce rape in war, but it seems to be inevitable that a reduction in war 
itself would come with any proposed solutions. Tickner suggests that the concept of citizen 
defender might come to replace the traditional warrior patriot ideal (Tickner, 1992, 60). Indeed, 
Tickner seems optimistic about the possibility for change in the nature of security in the world, 
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with the primary mechanism for change being the conversation. It is by bringing to light these 
imbalances inherent to “gender” that we can truly address these problems. 
In this thesis I have discussed the state of sexual violence in war, as it exists on seemingly 
as large a scale as war itself. It is a dominant (and somewhat accepted) occurrence in the 
existence of war, although we have rapidly changed the way we look at and prosecute such 
occurrences. I discussed several examples leading from the twentieth century up to the current 
time. 
I then examined the concepts of gender that exist in society and relate them to war and 
soldiers. I found that our concepts of masculinity relate quite heavily to features commonly 
attributed to war, like aggression, independence or dominance. However, as Maya Eichler 
phrases it, I find that “militarism and masculinism reinforce each other” (Eichler, 2014, 90). 
I then explored deeper into this concept to see how this conclusion could help explain the 
connection between militarism and rape. Again, I found that hegemonic masculinity was heavily 
connected to the existence of this phenomenon. It is a deeply entrenched societal structure that 
allows such a thing to carry on. 
Finally I conclude by examining some suggestions for change. Primarily the concept of 
disconnecting masculinity entirely from militarism seems impossible to entirely achieve, but the 
fact that any hegemony has an undercurrent of change within it suggests the possibility for 
hijacking the dominant notions of masculinity for the achievement of certain goals related to 
emancipation. This freeing of ourselves from the gender structure that society is embroiled 
within is only possible by subverting the direction of the change itself. The further involvement 
of women in the process seems to point toward a better future, but mostly it is important to 
detach from what we – specifically men like me – think we know about masculinity, femininity, 
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war, and peace. We can conceive of a better world only by working as one and, in particular, by 
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